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Abstract. (In)direct network effects arise frequently in economic models but, for rea-
sons of analytical tractability, are often assumed to be linear. Here, we examine the
general non-linear case with two platforms. We establish the conditions characterising
equilibria and show that welfare changes can be related in a simple, intuitive way to the
degree of diminishing returns of the network effects function.
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1. Introduction
Since the early work of Katz and Shapiro (1985), Farrell and Saloner (1986), and Arthur
(1989) there has been substantial work on models which involve ‘network effects’ whether
direct or indirect. Furthermore, many of the recent models of platform and two-sided
markets display reduced form indirect network effects – see e.g. Church et al. (2003).1
Much of this literature has focused, for reasons of analytical tractability, on the case linear
network effects (and heterogeneity).2 It is natural to wonder whether such a restriction is
‘innocent’.
In this paper we analyse the case of general network effects. Focusing on the classic case
of a Hotelling line of consumers choosing between two platforms/networks we characterise
equilibria in terms of the ‘advantage’ function and use this to sign welfare changes in
the neighbourhood of an equilibrium as a function of a) a simple change in network size
and b) a change in an ‘exogenous’ variable such as a platform owner’s price. It is shown
that these changes are closely related to the degree of diminishing returns in the network
Faculty of Economics, Cambridge University, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge, CB3 9DD. Email:
rp240@cam.ac.uk or rufus@rufuspollock.org.
1See also e.g. Church and Gandal (1992), Caillaud and Jullien (2003). For examples of work on two-sided
markets see (Armstrong, 2006; Nocke et al., 2007).
2Where this is not the case, such as in Church et al. (2003), only one specific functional form is considered.
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effects function with two distinct categories. Linear network effects exhibit no diminishing
returns and fall clearly within one of these two. As such, the choice of linearity is not
always ‘innocent’.
Finally, we note that our work complements the literature on the functional form of net-
work effects. For example, Swann (2002) (who summarizes most of the existing, largely
informal, work) examines the case of a telephone network and shows that network ef-
fects obey Metcalfe’s law (linearity) only under fairly restrictive conditions. When these
conditions are not satisfied, he argues that network effects will be S-shaped.
2. The Model
We start with the standard (in)direct networks model. There are two platforms/networks:
X = A,B located at either end of a Hotelling line of consumers (buyers) modelled by the
interval [0, 1]. The index, t ∈ [0, 1], is used to label consumers and the measure of con-
sumers on platform X is denoted by nX . All consumers are assumed to purchase from at
most one platform and for simplicity we assume all consumers purchase so nB = 1− nA.3
Where no confusion will result we drop the subscript on nA and just write n for A’s market
share. A consumer who purchases from platform X = A,B has a utility function which
displays (reduced form) network effects:4
uX(t, nX , P, Z) = gX(P )− hX(t) + νX(neX , Z, P )
P here represents a set of variables controlled by the platform owners – for example
platform price – while Z is some set of exogenous variables outside the control of any
participant (e.g. production costs). In most work, the ownership of platforms and the
associated competitive structure would be the focus of interest. Here we wish to leave
this largely to one side and simply assume that control variables enter the utility function
in some general way as described. hX represents consumer heterogeneity (‘travel costs’),
νX the indirect network effects function. All functions are assumed to be continuous and
differentiable. The full sequence of actions in this model is then as follows:
3This assumption is standard to the literature. It simplifies the analysis and places no great restriction on
the results.
4One can derive this functional form from a more complex two-sided platform model in which consumers
care not about a platform per-se but about obtaining ‘software/services’ (‘sellers’) associated with the
platform. See Church et al. (2003); Pollock (2007).
GENERAL NETWORK EFFECTS AND WELFARE 3
(1) Platform ‘Owners’ move (setting P ).
(2) Consumers form (common) expectations of platform sizes. Given these, each con-
sumer joins the platform which maximizes expected utility.
(3) Payoffs are realized.
Note that in equilibrium the resulting platform sizes must be consistent with rational
expectations. That is: actual and expected platform sizes must be equal. In this paper we
will be focusing only on the solution of the game from step 2 onwards taking P as given.
3. Solving the Model
We proceed by the usual method based on finding the marginal consumer indifferent
between the two platforms though introducing some new terminology along the way. De-
fine the conditional utility advantage of platform A over platform B for consumer t when
(expected) platform size is nA (suppressing Z,P variables for conciseness):
Aˆ(t, nA) = uA(t, nA)− uB(t, 1− nA)
and the utility advantage (function), which gives the utility advantage of platform A over
B if t is the marginal consumer (so t = nA):
A(t) = Aˆ(t, t) = νA(t)− νB(1− t)− (hA(t)− hB(t)) + (gA − gB)
Define E0 = {t : A(t) = 0} (the interior equilibria), E−0 = {0 : A(0) < 0} ∪ {1 : A(1) >
0} (the ‘standardization’ equilibria), and E = E0 ∪ E−0.
Proposition 1. The equilibria of the subgame are E. An equilibrium te ∈ E0 is stable
(with respect to perturbations in expectations) if A′(te) < 0. All te ∈ E−0 are stable.
Proof. See appendix. 
Note that the advantage function implicitly depends on P,Z and therefore so does the
set of equilibria E = E(P,Z). As such we can also think of a given equilibria being a
function of P,Z (at least for small changes in their value): te = te(P,Z).5 As such te can
be seen as a reduced-form demand function for platform A.
5Pick initial values P 0, Z0 and a particular equilibrium t0e ∈ E(P 0, Z0). Then for small changes in P,Z
the solution of A(t, P, Z) will vary continuously with P,Z and this is then te(P,Z).
4 RUFUS POLLOCK UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE AUGUST 4, 2008
4. Welfare
Total welfare, W = Π + WC where WC is consumer welfare and Π = ΠA + ΠB are
profits accruing to those associated with the two platforms.We shall not specify the detail
of the profits function other than to assume that it is a function of choice variables and
market share alone Π = Π(P, t(P,Z)). Consumer welfare can be derived directly from the
utility function and is given by (suppressing all variables other than n):
WC(n, P, Z) = −gB +n(gA−gB)+nνA(n)+(1−n)νB(1−n)−
∫ n
0
hA(x)dx−
∫ 1
n
hB(x)dx
Consider a change in one of the P or Z variables, denoted by p:
dWC
dp
=
∂WC
∂p
+
dn
dp
dWC
dn
There are clearly two distinct effects: a direct one (the first term) and an indirect one
(the second) which operates via a change in platform sizes. We consider the indirect effect
first.
Proposition 2. When current platform size is n0 the marginal change in consumer welfare
with respect to platform size t is:
dWC
dn
= A(n0) + µ(n0)
where A(n) is the utility advantage function and µ(n) ≡ nν ′A(n)− (1− n)ν ′B(1− n).
Proof. Differentiate with respect to n and use the definition of A(n) and µ(n). 
Corollary 3. At an interior equilibrium ne ∈ (0, 1), A(ne) = 0, and hence dWCdt = µ(ne).
Thus, at an interior equilibrium, the change in consumer welfare, with respect to platform
size, is a function of ‘network effects’ alone.
Restrict now to the case where the network effects function on the two platforms is the
same: νA = νB = ν. Then µ is anti-symmetric with regard to swapping the roles of the
two platforms (n → 1 − n) and thus, WLOG, we may restrict to ne ∈ [0.5, 1]. There are
two basic possibilities: consumer welfare is increasing (µ(ne) > 0) with platform size –
this corresponds to ‘standardization’ being preferable (all consumers on one platform); or,
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it is decreasing (µ(ne) < 0) with platform size – more symmetrical platform shares are
preferable.
The sign of µ(ne) is itself determined by the degree of curvature of the indirect network
effects function, ν which corresponds to the degree of diminishing returns to network effects
in platform size (how rapidly the benefit of a new user falls as the number of users on
the platform grows). Simple examination indicates that the dividing line between the two
cases is given by the natural logarithm: ν(n) = C+ ln(n). When marginal network effects
fall with platform size more gradually (e.g. ν linear) then µ > 0 and so standardization is
preferable. When marginal network effects fall more strongly (e.g. ν(n) ∝ −1/√n)6 then
µ < 0 and symmetry is preferable.
Returning to overall consumer welfare we can summarize the situation in a table 1. As
this shows, depending on the signs of the different effects, the overall impact is positive,
negative or ambiguous. To proceed further we need to impose some restrictions. To this
end focus upon the case where the variable being modified p comes from the set of choice
variables P . Additionally, let us suppose that the p variable is under the control of the
A platform (the following discussion applies with the obvious modifications to the case
where p is controlled by B).
Network Effects ∂W
C
∂p
dn
dp Consumer Welfare
Weakly
Diminishing
+ + +
+ - ?
- + ?
- - -
Strongly
Diminishing
+ + ?
+ - +
- + -
- - ?
Table 1. Consumer Welfare Changes. ‘?’ indicates the effect is ambiguous.
First, observe that almost always the interests of consumers and platform owners are
anti-aligned. That is, whatever benefits a platform owner (for example a higher price)
reduces consumer utility. Assuming, WLOG, that increases in p benefit the platform this
statement implies that direct effect is negative: ∂W
C
∂p < 0. This effect can operate via two
distinct routes: an increase in p reduces either uA or uB. The first case corresponds, for
6This form can be obtained from a circular city model of indirect network effects – see Pollock (2007).
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example, to the platform raising its price to increase revenue from its own users, while the
second to a situation where the platform is reducing the attractiveness of the competitor
in some way (e.g. by raising costs). Let us refer to these two cases as the ‘own platform’
and ‘other platform’ cases. In terms of market share t the ‘own platform’ case corresponds
to dndp < 0 while the ‘other platform’ case corresponds to
dn
dp > 0. Putting this together
we have table 2.7 This clearly shows the central role played by the form of the network
effects function. In particular, the weak and strong cases are ‘mirror images’ of each other
and thus the conclusions reached in models with weakly diminishing returns may differ
markedly from those with strongly diminishing ones.
Network Effects Own Platform Other Platform
Weakly Diminishing - ?
Strongly Diminishing ? -
Table 2. Welfare change as p increases. ‘?’ indicates effect is ambiguous.
5. Conclusion
We have examined the case of two competing platforms/networks when heterogeneity
and network effects have a very general form. The welfare effects of a change in network
sizes, and hence of variables such as prices, depend crucially on the degree of diminishing
returns in the (in)direct network effects function. With weakly diminishing returns (e.g.
linear) increasing platform size (all else being equal) increases welfare but the opposite is
true when diminishing returns are strong (sub-log).
Appendix A. Proof of 1
Proof. Fix expectations of network size ne and suppress (for the present) ne in Aˆ(t, ne)
to give Aˆ(t). A consumer chooses platform A over B if Aˆ(t) ≥ 0. Now Aˆ′(t) = dAˆ(t,neA)dt =
−h′A(t)− h′B((1− t) < 0 so Aˆ(t) is decreasing. Hence, if consumer tm chooses platform A
then all consumers t ∈ [0, tm) choose platform A (and vice-versa for B).
There now three possibilities. 1) Aˆ(t) > 0,∀t in which case all consumers choose A;
2) Aˆ(t) < 0,∀t in which case all consumers choose B; 3) ∃tm ∈ [0, 1], Aˆ(tm) = 0 and the
resulting platform size of A is tm (since Aˆ′ < 0 there is at most one such solution).
7Note that, at an equilibrium of the overall game, P variables are being chosen to maximize profits Π. In
this case dΠ
dp
≤ 0 (own effects are zero and the impact on a competitor will be zero or negative) hence the
results shown in the table will extend from consumer welfare to total welfare.
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Thus one may define a function f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] where for a given expected platform
size, ne, f(ne) is the resulting platform size. Imposing rational expectations requires that
n is an equilibrium if and only if f(n) = n. Now, n ∈ (0, 1) is a solution of f(n) = n ⇐⇒
Aˆ(n, n) = 0 ⇐⇒ n ∈ E0 while n = 0, 1 is a solution of f(n) = n ⇐⇒ n ∈ E−0.
Stability. Take tm ∈ E0 with A′(tm) = −2k < 0 and consider a perturbation in
expectations of network size  > 0. A′ < 0 so for  small enough have Aˆ(tm + , tm + ) =
A(tm + ) = −j < −k. Now Aˆ is continuous and decreasing in its first argument hence
∃δ ∈ (0, ) (unique) such that Aˆ(tm +  − δ, tm + ) = 0 and all consumers with indices
x ∈ (tm + − δ, tm + ] wish to switch back to B (as Aˆ(x, tm + ) < 0). We can now replace
 by −δ. Repeating this process we converge back to the equilibrium tm (were we to halt
before reaching tm at t′ ∈ (tm, tm + ) say, we would have A(t′) = 0 which is impossible).
The same argument can be made for negative . Thus the equilibrium is stable. For an
equilibrium tm ∈ E−0 we must have |A(tm)| < 0 and hence by continuity of A, Aˆ it too is
stable. 
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